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”The whole system of capitalist production is based on the
fact that the workman sells his labour-power as a commodity.
Division of labour specialises this labour-power, by reducing it to
skill in handling a particular tool. So soon as the handling of this
tool becomes the work of a machine, then, with the use-value, the
exchange-value too, of the workman’s labour-power vanishes; the
workman becomes unsaleable, like paper money thrown out of
currency by legal enactment. That portion of the working-class,
thus by machinery rendered superfluous, i.e., no longer immedi-
ately necessary for the self-expansion of capital, either goes to the
wall in the unequal contest of the old handicrafts and manufac-
tures with machinery, or else floods all the more easily accessible
branches of industry, swamps the labour-market, and sinks the
price of labour-power below its value. ”– Karl Marx, Das Kap-
ital, Vol. 1, Ch. 15.
Marx’s vision of technical progress as an instrument of capitalist exploita-
tion that raises profits at the expense of wages has been invalidated by more
than a century of improvements in living standards. But in the last few
decades inequality has risen in the United States, average real wages have
stagnated, and have indeed fallen for the poorest, bringing up again the
question of whether technical change may harm workers.
One difference between this recent process and Marx’s vision is that it
does not only benefit capitalists, but also ’knowledge’ workers specialized in
the production of new blueprints and ideas. These people are able to gain a
lot in terms of income, because many of the new goods they help to invent
(media, software, records, etc...) are very cheap to produce, and therefore
cover a very large market.1 Thus, some authors such as Robert Reich (1992)
envision a society with a widening cleavage between ”symbol manipulators”
and ordinary workers. However, Reich is silent about the mechanism by
1See Rosen (1981) for an analysis of this ”economics of superstars”. The effects studied
here are somewhat related, but different.
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which high productivity transfers income from the latter to the former.
A related view, which goes back to early critiques of consumer’s society,
is that unless new needs are created, productivity growth is bound to make
workers useless. This view is exemplified in a book by Rifkin (1996) called
The End of Work. Indeed, one characteristic of modern Western society is
the saturation of many needs; households are loaded with consumer appli-
ances, vehicles, clothes, and so forth. A visitor from a low income country
would be struck by the proliferation of shops specialized in plainly useless
goods. Such bliss is permitted by the very low production costs that secular
productivity growth has generated. This phenomenon is bound to accelerate
with the growing share of intangible goods such as music, software, or video
games, whose production cost is very small. But again, here, there lacks
an explicit economic mechanism which would explain why such saturation
would be associated with declining wages or employment. First, it is not clear
why consumption would not adjust so as to absorb increases in productive
capacity; second, more affluence intuitively means higher living standards.
This paper develops an orthodox economic model where a society which
resembles Reich’s and Rifkin’s speculations actually arises2. In this model,
needs are limited in that utility from consuming any given good is bounded.
As in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), each good is a differentiated brand produced
by a monopoly. Contrary to Dixit-Stiglitz, demand is not isoelastic, because
of limited needs. A central result is that beyond some point productivity im-
provements reduce wages–if properly measured as the return to production
work–in a fashion echoing Marx’s gloomy predictions about the pauperi-
sation of proletariat. In contrast, such improvements boost the profits and
market values of firms. If goods are invented by workers specialized in R and
D, then these workers’ income goes up as well.
Bounded needs are intimately linked to the negative effect that produc-
tivity eventually has on wages. This is because when utility is bounded,
2A very different attempt to rationalize criticisms of mass consumption societies can
be found in Benhabib and Bisin (2001).
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the price elasticity of demand for a given good falls to zero with the aver-
age consumption of that good. Consequently, if the good is produced by a
monopolist, the markup over marginal cost will become very large as con-
sumption goes up. Given the number of goods, general productivity growth
raises consumption of each good, pushing markups to infinity. In general
equilibrium, this means that real wages end up falling to zero. That is, more
than 100 % of the growth in GDP permitted by productivity growth is ap-
propriated by profits, i.e. by those who own property rights over blueprints.
For tractable bounded utility functions, such as quadratic or exponen-
tial ones, I show that as productivity in the material goods sector goes up,
the economy first goes through a ”Solovian” zone where wages increase, and
then reaches a ”Marxian” zone where further productivity growth reduces
wages—because markups increase more than proportionately. This fatality is
inevitable unless new goods are being introduced. To consider that possibil-
ity, I assume (realistically, in my view) that while utility from any given good
is bounded, new goods are always equally valued by consumers regardless of
the initial number of goods. An increase in the number of varieties reduces
consumption of any given good, thus moving the economy away from the
low-elasticity, saturation zone. Therefore, the question is: do productivity
increases result in the introduction of a sufficient number of additional goods
in order to prevent wages from falling?
The rise in profitability brought about by productivity growth increases
the incentives for innovation as well as the wage of research labor. Thus,
labor is reallocated away from production into knowledge, which tends to
increase the number of goods; this in turns reduces consumption of each
good, moving it away from the saturation point, so that elasticity rises and
markups fall. Therefore, these effects tend to offset an initial reduction in
wages. Whether or not a Marxian zone (where absolute wages fall) exists
then depend on how strong these effects are. But the wages of production
workers relative to knowledge workers still unambiguously falls.
This picture of technical change which raises inequality and possibly low-
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ers absolute wages at the bottom of the distribution of earnings, is reminis-
cent of the US economy in the last three decades. The empirical literature has
established that inequality has increased, that wages have stagnated overall,
and that they have actually fallen for the least skilled. It has concluded that
this is probably explained by a relative demand shift due to skill-biased tech-
nical progress.3 One key contribution of the present paper is to show that
even though skill-bias may not be directly embodied in technology, produc-
tivity may increase inequality because of the general equilibrium interaction
between imperfect competition and bounded needs. General productivity
growth increases the (absolute and relative) returns to creativity, which is
indexed on profits and thus positively linked to markups. If more skilled
workers have a comparative advantage in these activities, then inequality
will indeed increase.
This mechanism is quite different from the ones that have been discussed
in the recent literature (Zeira (1998), Krusell et. al. (2000), Caselli (2000),
Acemoglu (1999,2000), or Beaudry and Green (2003)), which has emphasized
that new technologies result in the allocation of more capital to skilled work-
ers at the expense of unskilled ones. It is also different from the one studied
by Cohen and Saint-Paul (1994), who, following Baumol (1967,1985), show
that if sectors are complementary to each other and labor is imperfectly mo-
bile, technical progress in a given sector may harm workers in that sector if
productivity remains the same in the rest of the economy.4
While one does not want to dismiss other mechanisms as contributors
to the observed rise in inequality in the United States, particularly because
not all of it may be due to a greater return to creativity, the phenomenon
studied here may also have played a role. In particular, Morrison (1992), has
found an upward trend in price-costs markups in both the US and Japan
3See Katz and Murphy (1992), Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) and Levy and Murnane
(1992).
4Falkinger (1990,1994) and Foellmi and Zweimüller (2002) study the reverse problem,
i.e., the impact of income distribution on innovation in models of hierarchical needs and
nonlinear Engel curves.
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over the relevant period.5 Also, in section 3.3 we find that increases in the
ratio between consumption per capita and the number of brands tend lo lead
increases in inequality in the eighties and nineties.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 1, I study a static gen-
eral equilibrium model with a fixed number of goods each produced by a
monopoly, and bounded utility. I show that the response of wages to pro-
ductivity is hump-shaped. At high productivity levels the economy eventu-
ally reaches a ”Marxian” zone where wages fall in response to productivity
improvements. Section 2 studies the consequences of allowing the number
of goods to be endogenous, by assuming that labor can be allocated be-
tween production and invention—which also allows to study the distribution
of wages when workers have different skills and may elect to become produc-
tion workers or knowledge workers. It also studies balanced growth paths
when productivity grows in the innovation sector as well as in the produc-
tion sector. Section 3 discusses some applications of the model, namely the
effect of productivity growth on employment when labor is unionized, and
the effect of international trade on wages6. It also looks at comovements
between inequality and consumption per product, and finds that they are
broadly consistent with the model. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
1 The effect of total factor productivity on
wages in a static general equilibrium model
of monopolistic competition.
In this section, we analyze the determinants of markups and wages in a static
model with a fixed number of goods. We show that if utility derived from any
given good is bounded, then wages eventually fall in response to increases in
total factor productivity.
5See also Nevo (1999), who finds high markups in ready to eat cereals, a banal good of
which many households are not far from being saturated.
6In particular, I show that wages in the poorest country may fall in response to greater
openness, a result reminiscent of a recent paper by Matsuyama (2000).
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1.1 Basic setting
Let us start with a static model with a fixed, exogenous number of goods.
Consider an economy with a continuum of goods of mass N and a contin-
uum of consumers of mass 1. Together, these consumers supply an inelastic
quantity of labor equal to L. They potentially differ in their labor endowment
and in the fraction of corporate capital that they own, in a way which need
not be specified yet. The utility of consumer j is given by
uj =
Z N
0
v(cij)di, (1)
where cij is agent j’s consumption of good i and v is given by
v(c) = 1− e−bc. (2)
In that formulation, cardinal utility is bounded, contrary to what one
would get under the usual isoelastic case v(c) = cα,α ≥ 0. As shown and
discussed below, this feature has important implications. Utility also satisfies
u(0) = 0, so that it is invariant to introducing new goods that are consumed
in zero quantity.
Let Rj denote the income of consumer j, which is the sum of his labor
income and his dividend income. People maximize their utility function (1)
subject to their budget constraintZ N
0
picij = Rj,
where pi denotes the price of good i. The resulting demand function is:
cij = max(−
1
b
ln
pi
b
+
R N
0
pm
b
ln pm
b
dm+RjR N
0
pmdm
; 0) (3)
Assuming cij > 0 for all i, j, it can be aggregated across consumers to get
the aggregate demand for good i :
ci = −
1
b
ln
pi
b
+
R N
0
pm
b
ln pm
b
dmR N
0
pmdm
+
YR N
0
pmdm
, (4)
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where ci =
R 1
0
cijdj is total consumption of good i and Y =
R 1
0
Rijdj is total
income. Note that demand does not depend on the distribution of income,
a convenient feature given this paper’s focus on the effect of pricing and
productivity on income distribution, rather than the converse.7
Each good is produced by a monopoly using labor as the only input.
One unit of labor produces a units of a good. The monopoly maximizes its
profit pici − wci/a, where w is the wage, subject to (4). As each monopoly
is atomistic, it neglects the effect of its price on the integral in the RHS
of (4). Consequently, its optimal price, assuming it is in the zone where all
consumers consume all goods, is determined by the first-order condition
−1
b
ln
pi
b
+
R N
0
pm
b
ln pm
b
dmR N
0
pmdm
+
YR N
0
pmdm
=
pi − w/a
bpi
(5)
We have one degree of freedom in normalizing prices. Since all prices are
equal by symmetry, it is natural to normalize them to one. Note then that
one has to be cautious in interpreting wages, as welfare may go up if w falls
but N rises at the same time: Income still represents purchasing power in
physical terms, but fails to capture the effects of greater diversity on utility.8
Given that pi = 1, Equation (5) then boils down to an equation linking
wages with aggregate income:
w = a(1− bY/N). (6)
How is then R determined? Aggregating budget constraints, we get that
the consumption of each good is given by
ci = c = Y/N, ∀i.
7One can show that demand functions can be aggregated into a function of aggregate
income and prices, only for power, quadratic, and exponential utility functions.
8Under homothetic preferences, one could normalize the aggregate price level to one,
and given that its definition reflects the value of product diversity, wages would truly
reflect welfare. Here, however, indirect utility cannot be written as R/p.
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Finally, equilibrium in the labor market implies that Nc = aL, so that
we simply have
Y = aL. (7)
Substituting into (6) we get the formula determining wages:
w = a(1− baL/N) (8)
The most interesting property of (8) is that w is not monotonous in
a. Rather, it is hump-shaped, as illustrated in Figure 1. As productivity
increases, the economy gradually moves from a Solovian zone where pro-
ductivity improvements raise wages to a Marxian zone where they are more
than entirely appropriated by profits and wages actually fall. There exists a
critical level of productivity where wages are exactly equal to zero, given by
a = N/bL.
1.2 Discussion
The paradoxical existence of a Marxian zone, where wages fall with produc-
tivity, comes from the limited needs and imperfect competition properties of
the model. In equilibrium, wages are equal to the product of productivity
a and the inverse markup 1 − baL/N. Thus, when productivity goes up, so
does the markup.
Why? With v(c) = 1−e−bc, the local price elasticity of demand for a good
consumed in quantity c is given by 1/bc. Elasticity is therefore decreasing,
and converging to zero, as consumption goes up. That is, while people are
willing to pay less for a good, they are also locally less sensitive to its price.
That is the key difference between the bounded utility considered here and
the usual isoelastic formulation. Consequently, the markup goes up with
aggregate income, and therefore with productivity. If markups were con-
stant, productivity increases would instead generate proportional increases
in wages.
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The end point of the Marxian zone, where wages become equal to zero,
correspond to the point where markups are infinite, i.e. the elasticity of
demand for each good is equal to one9.
One may wonder whether the Marxian zone is an artifact of the specifi-
cation. Consider, alternatively, the case where v is quadratic:
v(c) = c(1− bc/2).
Using the same steps as in the previous subsection, one may easily check
that equilibrium wages are given by
w = a
N − 2baL
N − baL .
This function is again hump-shaped: conclusions are the same as in the
exponential case. Next, consider any general utility function v(c) which is
bounded. If a consumer consumes c units of a good, the price elasticity of
demand is given by η = |v0(c)/cv00(c)| . One can show that for any bounded
utility, as c goes up the elasticity η = |v0(c)/cv00(c)| ends up being lower than
any ε > 1, which means that we can find arbitrarily large values of c such that
the associated markup η/(η−1) is arbitrarily large.10 Thus, by continuity, if
needs are bounded, if we start from an equilibrium with a positive wage and
let productivity grow, a Marxian zone necessarily arises.
To conclude, while a single hump is an attractive feature of the exponen-
tial (or quadratic) specifications, the existence of a Marxian zone does not
rely on any specific utility function, it is a necessary consequence of bounded
needs.
9Thus, at that point, c = 1/b,i.e. aL/N = 1/b.
10The proof is as follows. Assume −v0/cv00 > ε > 1 for all c ≥ c0. Then integrating the
inequality −v00/v0 < 1/(εc) between c and c0 yields ln v0(c) > ln v0(c0)−(ln c− ln c0)/ε, i.e.
v0(c) > v0(c0)(c/c0)−1/ε. Integrating again, we get v(c) > v0(c0)/c
−1/ε
0
ε
ε−1(c
1−1/ε−c1−1/ε0 ),
which is not bounded.
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Note that when a goes up, wages fall, or at most increase less than pro-
portionally to GDP, so that profits must increase more than proportionally.
Formally, profits are given by πi = (pi − w/a)ci, i.e.
πi = π = b
µ
aL
N
¶2
(9)
They increase more quickly than a and account for 100 % of GDP when one
reaches the end of the Marxian zone at a = N/bL. Productivity growth re-
distributes income from workers to owners of firms. Markups go up because
consumers are less elastic on average, but a person with just labor income
would become more elastic if the economy is in the Marxian zone. Reduced
elasticity from ”capitalists” who get richer more than offsets increased elas-
ticity from ”workers” who get poorer.
Another aspect is that wages go up with the number of varietiesN. 11AsN
goes up, less is consumed of each good, which pushes consumers further away
from their maximum utility and increases the elasticity of demand for each
good, thus reducing markups and raising equilibrium wages. Hence intro-
ducing new goods ”de-banalizes” consumption and runs against the Marxian
zone.
1.3 Some technical problems
In the preceding results, we have assumed some arbitrary degree of hetero-
geneity across agents, and characterized a symmetrical equilibrium where all
agents consume all goods. The above results then hold conditional on the
existence of such a symmetrical equilibrium.
In fact, the existence of a symmetrical equilibrium is far from obvious,
especially in the quadratic and exponential cases that we have just discussed.
The reason is that in both cases, the Inada conditions are not satisfied, so
11Note that since our price normalization implies that wages are expressed in physical
terms, that effect is different from the effect of the number of goods on utility due to the
taste for variety.
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that it may be optimal for a consumer not to consume a good at all if the
price of that good is large enough compared to the prices of other goods.
Of course, in symmetrical equilibrium, all agents consume all goods, unless
some agents have zero income. But a firm can consider deviating by charging
a high price and putting itself in a zone where only consumers richer than
a given income level would consume its good.12 While (5) is a necessary
condition for an equilibrium where all agents consume all goods, it does not
rule out such a possibility.13
To solve this problem, one has several options. The first one is to assume a
representative agent (or, equivalently, that all agents have purchased perfect
insurance prior to the realization of inequality), and study the factor rather
than personal distribution of income. The second one is to impose restrictions
on the distribution of income such that a symmetrical equilibrium exists. The
following proposition guarantees the existence of a symmetrical equilibrium
with strictly positive wages14:
Proposition 1 — Assume income R is distributed among agents with c.d.f.
G(R), G0 = g. Assume preferences are given by (2). Let Y =
R +∞
0
g(R)RdR.
Assume Y < N/b. If
∀z > 0, E(R | R ≥ z) ≤ z + Y, (10)
then there exists a symmetrical equilibrium where all firms charge pi = 1
and wages are given by (6).
PROOF — See Appendix
Condition (10), which is satisfied for an exponential distribution g(R) =
γe−γ(R−R0), makes it unprofitable for an individual producer to deviate from
12I am indedbted to Josef Zweimuller and Reto Foellmi for bringing this point to my
attention.
13A milder problem is that even if all consumers consume all goods, the first-order
condition (5) tells us nothing about whether this is actually a global optimum for each
firm; and it is not obvious to establish such a property, as the profit function π(p) of a
monopoly is never concave.
14For aL > N/b, one may construct under-employment equilibria with zero wages; these
are not particularly plausible, so we abstract from them.
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a symmetrical equilibrium by charging a higher price than others and exclude
some consumers from its market. Intuitively, it tells us that the average
income of consumers above a given level should not increase ”too fast” with
that level — otherwise, firms are tempted to focus on rich consumers and
charge high prices. While Proposition 1 is a partial equilibrium result, since
it takes as given the distribution of income G(.) which is endogenous, there
is no difficulty in computing G() from the distribution of firm ownership
and labor endowments, since equilibrium profits and wages can be computed
straightforwardly from (8) and (9). As checking directly for (10) may be
cumbersome, we provide another condition which is more easy to check:
Lemma 1 — A sufficient condition for (10) to hold is
g(v + z)
1−G(z) ≤ g(v),∀v, z. (11)
PROOF—See Appendix.
2 Extensions
We now analyse two key extensions of the model. The first one endogenizes
the number of goods, by assuming workers have different skills and elect
between production work and innovation. The second one allows for long-
term balanced growth, by allowing the cost of inventing new goods to fall
with time.
2.1 Endogenizing the number of goods and the personal
distribution of income
The preceding discussion implies that under the ”limited needs” assumption,
an increase in productivity increases profits more than proportionally, and
wages less than proportionally. Consequently, incentives to work in the pro-
duction sector fall relative to incentives to introduce new goods. If workers
can elect between working as ”productive workers” vs. working as ”creative
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workers”— i.e. inventing new goods — then an increase in total factor pro-
ductivity will trigger labor reallocation from the productive to the creative
sector. The number of goods rises, consumption of each good falls, which
pushes markups down and wages up. Intuitively, if the supply response of
creative workers is sufficiently elastic, this effect can be strong enough so as
to offset the direct negative effect of productivity on wages. In that case
there is no Marxian zone and all agents benefit from productivity growth. If
the supply response is insufficient, then wages fall and the Marxian zone still
exists. However, in both cases, as we shall see, relative inequality goes up.
To analyze this point, we extend the model so as to endogenize the allo-
cation of labor between production and innovation. This will also be useful
to analyze the effect of productivity growth on the distribution of wages
between ”creative” and ”productive” workers.
We take the preceding model as our basis, and now endogenize both L
and N. There exists a continuum of workers of mass 1 indexed by s ∈ [0, 1].
s denotes the ranking of a worker in the distribution of skills. A worker
with skill s is endowed with l(s) units of productivity and h(s) units of
creativity. Both l and h are increasing and differentiable. Furthermore, the
ratio h(s)/l(s) is assumed to be increasing with s. Thus creativity is more
sensitive to skill than productivity, implying that the most skilled workers
will sort themselves into the creative occupation.
Workers must elect between working in the production sector, in which
case they supply l(s) units of labor and earn wl(s), and working in the R
& D sector — where goods are invented — where they earn ωh(s).15 I assume
free entry of firms in the R & D sector, so that all profits are appropriated
by productive workers. Assuming that h units of creativity allow to invent
h goods, then in equilibrium one must have ω = π. Both π and w remain
determined by (8) (9) as long as the economy is in a symmetrical equilibrium.
15In this static model, the research input needed to invent a good and consumption of
that good coincide in time.
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Clearly, in equilibrium, there exists a critical skill s∗ determined by
h(s∗)/l(s∗) = w/ω, (12)
and such that all workers above s∗ work in R & D, and all the others in the
production sector. Consequently, we must have
N =
Z 1
s∗
h(s)ds = N(w/ω), N 0(.) < 0;
L =
Z s∗
0
l(s)ds = L(w/ω), L0(.) > 0, L(0) = 0
The model is then closed by determining the equilibrium ratio w/ω, which
must be consistent with the determination of wages and profits. Using again
(9) and (8) we get
w
ω
=
(N(w/ω)− baL(w/ω))
baL(w/ω)2
N(w/ω) ≡ υ(ω)
As shown on Figure 2, that uniquely determines the price of productivity
relative to creativity, w/ω. Furthermore, an increase in total factor produc-
tivity a clearly reduces the equilibrium level of w/ω, and that is again due
to the rise in the markup.
The distribution of log wages is depicted on Figure 3. Because of the
assumption that h(.) rises faster than l(.) with skills, there is a jump in the
return to skill around the critical level s∗. Figure 4 shows the effect of an
increase in a : inequality between creative and productive workers goes up
and there is reallocation of labor away from the production sector into the R
& D sector. In Figure 4a, the absolute wage of productivity falls (Marxian
zone); in Figure 4b, it does not (Solovian zone). As stated above, both the
reduction in labor supply and the increase in the number of varieties tend
to push wages up. This makes the Marxian zone less likely, the stronger the
response of labor supply to the fall of w/ω.16 However, as long as the ratio
16The precise condition is
0 >
dw
da
= 1− 2baL− ba2L0 d(w/ω)
da
+ ba2
LN 0
N2
d(w/ω)
da
,
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L/N falls less than proportionally to a, (8) implies that a Marxian zone will
eventually arise.
To summarize: endogenizing the allocation of labor between produc-
tion and innovation does not affect the result that an increase in total fac-
tor productivity increases inequality between profits/creative workers and
wages/productive workers. It predicts that product variety goes up, and the
supply of productive labor down, when TFP goes up; this tends to push
wages up, but the effect need not be strong enough to preclude a Marxian
zone.
In this discussion, we have implicitly assumed that a symmetrical equi-
librium exists. Is that granted? It clearly depends on the properties of the
h(.) and l(.) functions. In the Appendix, we show that if the l(.) and h(.)
functions have the following functional form:
l(s) = l0 −
ln(1− s)
β
; (13)
h(s) = h0 −
ln(1− h)
γ
,
then Lemma 1 applies, so that there exists a symmetrical equilibrium.
2.2 Welfare
We have so far analyzed the effect of productivity on wages. Wages are
different from welfare for two reasons: first, individuals own claims on firms
in addition to labor; second, the number of goods may change and it directly
affects welfare because of the taste for variety.
One can check that the utility of a person owning l units of labor is given
where d(w/ω)da is given by
d(w/ω)
da
= − bL+ bL
2w/ω
baL+ 2baLL0w/ω −N 0 + baL0 .
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by
u(l) = N(1− e−bwl/N).
Consequently, if the wage changes by dw and the number of goods changes
by dN, that person’s utility changes by
du(l) = ble−bwl/Ndw + dN(1− e−bwl/N(1 + bwl
N
)),
where 1− e−bwl/N(1 + bwl
N
) > 0.17
Therefore, if N is held fixed, wage reductions triggered by productivity
improvements unambiguously reduce the welfare of workers—only if every-
body owns enough shares may welfare go up for all agents. When one en-
dogenizes the number of goods, as in the preceding subsection, N goes up
with a. That effect may in principle be large enough to compensate for wage
reductions: people lose in physical purchasing power but gain in product
variety. However, for arbitrarily poor agents, the gains from diversity are
second order relative to the loss from reduced purchasing power. To see this,
note that for l small, ∂u/∂N = 1− e−bwl/N(1 + bwl
N
) ≈ b2w2l2
2N2
¿ ∂u/∂w = bl.
Thus, poor enough people only care about physical purchasing power, not
diversity. Regardless of the response of N to a, some agents will lose from
productivity growth in the Marxian zone, provided there exist agents en-
dowed with an arbitrarily low level of l.18 This property comes from the fact
that u0(c) remains bounded as c approaches zero: When one consumes very
little of each good, utility is near-linear, and the value of diversity is neg-
ligible. In principle, it may not hold if u is such that limc→0 u0(c) = +∞,
although there is no tractable functional form for u which satisfies both that
condition and the limited needs property.
17Proof: the function h(x) = 1 − xe−x − e−x satisfies h(0) = 0 and h0(x) = xe−x > 0
for x > 0. Therefore, h(x) > 0 for all x > 0.
18In the context of the previous subsection’s model, these agents will indeed specialize
in production as long as the h/l ratio goes up with s.
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2.3 Balanced vs. unbalanced growth
We have seen that TFP growth depresses the relative, and possibly absolute
wage of production workers, assuming that it was the only source of technical
progress.
In this section I want to point out that these sharp predictions only hold
because growth is unbalanced, i.e. productivity increases in the material
goods sector but not in the innovation sector. If the cost of producing new
blueprints falls at the same rate as the cost of producing output, one can
construct a balanced growth path where wages for researchers and workers
grow at that common rate (hence all wages trend upward, and inequality
is constant), while a Marxian zone may still exist in that a once-and-for
all increase in productivity in the output sector may permanently reduce
worker’s wages relative to their previous growth path.
To see this, let us describe how the model can be extended to construct a
growth model, restricting ourselves to the case where the economy’s endow-
ments in H and L are fixed and exogenous.
The inflow of new blueprints is determined by the supply of intellectual
labor H. The number of varieties Nt evolves according to
N˙t = H/γt,
where γt = γ0e
−gt is the unit cost (in terms of creative labor) of producing a
good.19
The static model described in the previous section is still valid intratem-
porally, with the following modifications. First, total factor productivity a
is now time-varying, and thus denoted by at = a0egt. Second, expenditure
at t, which must replace income in the intratemporal demand functions for
individual goods, must now be consistent with intertemporal optimization
19Contrary to what is assumed in Grossman and Helpman (1991) , γt is exogenous and
there is no externality from the aggregate number of goods to γt.
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by consumers. That is, we now assume that consumer j maximizes
Uj =
Z +∞
0
ujte
−ρtdt, (14)
where ujt is defined by (1) (with a time subscript appended to cijt), and where
maximization takes place subject to the intertemporal budget constraintZ +∞
0
Rjte
−
R t
0 rududt ≤Wj, (15)
where Rjt now denotes total expenditure on goods at date t, Wj is the agent’s
total wealth and ru the instantaneous real interest rate at date u.We are still
analyzing a symmetrical equilibrium where all goods have the same price.20
Our price normalization is unchanged, pit = 1, and consumption of each
good by consumer j thus remains determined by cijt = cjt = Rjt/Nt. As
ujt = Nt(1 − e−bRjt/Nt), we see that the Euler equation corresponding to
(14)-(15) is
R˙jt/Rjt =
r + bN˙t/Nt − ρ
b
. (16)
Thus, expenditure grows at the same rate for all consumers, so that one
may replace Rjt by aggregate expenditure Yt in (16).. In equilibrium, sum-
ming expenditures over all goods, we again get that Yt = atL. Since in steady
state N˙/N = g = a˙/a, we clearly have
ρ = r.
20To prove that such an equilibrium exists, one may proceed in two steps. First, show
that if a static symmetrical equilibrium exists for Y = atL, then r = ρ and Rt = atL is
necessary and sufficient for market clearing and intertemporal optimization in steady state,
as maximizing (14) subject to (15) is a standard, concave, optimal control problem. Then,
check that a symmetrical static equilibrium exists for Y = atL, by applying something like
Proposition 1, or assume a representative consumer, to rule out deviations where firms
exclude some consumers.
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The intra-period demand functions and pricing rules are unchanged. Con-
sequently, the wage equation (8) still holds. We rewrite it for convenience,
adding time indices:
wt = at(1− batL/Nt).
In steady state, a/N is a constant, so wages grow at rate g. On the other
hand, the formula implies that a once-and-for all increase in the level of a
(i.e. an increase in a0 if one assumes at = a0egt) may reduce the level of
wages by a fixed amount in the new steady state relative to the old one.
Inventors get a patent which gives them monopoly power over the pro-
duction of the new variety for ever. The value of such a patent, Vt, evolves
according to
rtVt = πt + V˙t,
where πt is the profit of a monopoly at t, which is still given by (9).
Competition in the R and D sector guarantees that the cost of producing
a variety equals the value of a patent:
γtωt = Vt (17)
We can see readily that in steady state,
ωt =
b
ργt
µ
Lat
Nt
¶2
.
Noting that in steady state one must have Nt = H/(γ0g).e
gt, this can be
rewritten as
ωt =
b
ρ
γ0e
gt
µ
La0g
H
¶2
.
An interesting aspect is that higher growth rates increase the return to
creativity relative to productivity:
19
ωt
wt
=
b
ργ0
¡
La0g
H
¢2
a0(1− ba0γ0gL/H)
.
The explanation is as follows. Because goods are only accumulated grad-
ually through invention, an acceleration in the growth rate reduces the equi-
librium number of goods relative to the productivity level, in a fashion similar
to the negative effect of growth on the equilibrium capital/output ratio in
standard growth models. As a result, one consumes more of each good, so
that firms can charge higher markups. This redistributes income in favor
of firms, and eventually in favor of creative labor whose wage is indexed on
profits.
To conclude, this section has shown that balanced growth is feasible if
productivity in inventing new goods grows in line with productivity in pro-
ducing existing goods. If the latter grows faster than the former, then the
economy eventually enters a Marxian zone with falling wages, for the reasons
explained at the beginning of the paper.
Along a balanced growth path, productivity gains in the innovation sector
make sure that enough new goods are introduced to match increased con-
sumption possibilities, so as to prevent consumption of each good and thus
markups from going up.
3 Applications
In this section, I show how the model can shed light on various policy debates.
First, I consider what happens in the model if real wages are rigid, i.e. set
by unions. That may be especially relevant for continental Europe. I show
that rather than reducing wages, productivity growth then unambiguously
increases unemployment. Second, I look at the impact of ‘globalization’, i.e.
international trade, and show that if, under autarchy, relative productivity
in poor countries is lower than their relative number of varieties, then trade
reduce wages in the poorest countries, as workers there face higher markups
20
because of the low elasticity of demand coming from rich countries. Finally,
I present some illustrative evidence in favour of the model by looking at
comovements between consumption per good and inequality.
3.1 Unions
It is often argued that in continental Europe, inequality has not risen, in
particular because wages are rigid. One may then ask how the previous
results would be changed if wages were rigid. To analyze this, we consider
the role of labor unions. Going back to the simple static model of section 1,
let us assume that the wage within each firm is determined by a monopoly
union which maximizes the total wage bill. The firm takes wages as given,
while unions set wages prior to price-setting by firms, i.e. fully take into
account the effect of their wage on their firm’s prices. Total employment
is now endogenous and must adjust to make firms’ and unions’ behaviour
compatible with each other.
Equation (4) gives us the demand function for each firm, from which the
demand curve for labor from the point of view of the union can be easily
obtained:
li = l(wi) =
ci
a
= ci =
−1
b
ln pi
b
+
R N
0
pm
b
ln pm
b
dmR N
0 pmdm
+ YR N
0 pmdm
a
, (18)
where pi is an implicit function of wi, determined by the firm’s optimal pricing
policy (5), which we rewrite for convenience:
−1
b
ln
pi
b
+
R N
0
pm
b
ln pm
b
dmR N
0
pmdm
+
YR N
0
pmdm
=
pi − wi/a
bpi
. (19)
The union setting wages for product i thus maximizes wil(wi), under (18)
and (19). The FOC is l(wi)+wil0(wi) = 0. Let us again look for a symmetrical
equilibrium where pm = 1, for all m. Then the union’s first order condition
can be written
−1
b
ln pi +
Y
N
=
wi
bpi
dpi
dwi
, (20)
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where dpi/dwi is computed from (19), yielding
dpi
dwi
=
1
a(2− bY/N) .
Substituting, and imposing now pi = 1, we get
wi = w = a
bY
N
(2− bY
N
) (21)
= a
baL
N
(2− baL
N
)
while (19) still implies the same equilibrium relationship between w and L :
w = a(1− baL
N
) (22)
The equilibrium values of wages and employment are now jointly deter-
mined by (21) and (22). We get:
w = ak,
where k =
¡√
5− 1
¢
/2, and
L =
N(1− k)
ab
Consequently, wages are proportional to productivity and there is no
Marxian zone. Insiders appropriate a fraction k of productivity gains. Wages
can grow proportionally to productivity only if markups remain constant.
As growth in the consumption of each good pushes markups up, for union
wages to be compatible with price-setting21, consumption must not rise when
productivity goes up. Therefore, equilibrium employment must fall propor-
tionally with productivity!
21That unemployment adjusts to make wage formation compatible with price formation
is a cornerstone of modern macroeconomics. See Blanchard (1986), Layard et al. (1990).
Here productivity growth increases markups and thus the natural rate of unemployment.
Unemployment remains constant, however, if this is matched by an equiproportional in-
crease in the number of goods.
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By generating unemployment, this unionized economy prevents expendi-
ture from going up as productivity increases: markups do not increase and
the Marxian zone is not reached, at the cost of higher unemployment.
Note that in this unionized world, people would quite naturally believe
in the ‘end of work’, as productivity increases always reduce employment.
Proponents of the ‘ ‘end of work’ view would mistakenly interpret the lump
of output as a ”law”, whereas it is a consequence of the war of mark-ups
between firms and unions.
Furthermore, even if firms were to charge a constant markup, employ-
ment would still be inversely proportional to productivity. The reason is
that the declining elasticity property would still apply to labor demand, thus
prompting unions to increase their wage demands as consumption goes up.
To see this, assume that rather than being produced by a monopoly, each
good i is produced by a large number of perfectly competitive firms. Wages
in sector i, however, are still set by a single monopoly union. One then clearly
has pi = wi/a. To compute a symmetrical equilibrium, one then just has to
substitute w = a for (22) and dpi/dwi = 1/a in (20). We now get
w = a;
L =
N
ab
.
Wages are still proportional to a and employment falls proportionally
with productivity.
Of course, the property that productivity growth generates an equipropor-
tional fall in employment in a unionized economy is extreme: one eventually
expects union power to fall with employment, and people can find jobs in the
non unionized sector. But the results accord strikingly with often-heard com-
plaints about productivity growth reducing employment, and the fact that
these complaints are more common in the rigid labor markets of continental
Europe than in Anglo-Saxon countries.
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3.2 Globalization
The model may also have striking implications regarding the impact of ‘glob-
alization’, i.e. international trade, on wages. While the empirical literature
has somewhat discredited the idea that trade is responsible for the observed
rise in inequality (see e.g. Lawrence and Slaughter (1993)), the typical predic-
tion is that trade should exert a downward pressure on wages of the unskilled
in rich countries, because this factor is more abundant in poor countries.
Thus if one could blame it for increased inequality in rich countries, at least
the poorest in poor countries would gain, which is somewhat reassuring.
I show that this prediction may well be reversed, i.e. unskilled wages
may rise in rich countries and fall in poor countries, so that globalization
may lead to falling inequality in rich countries and rising inequality in poor
countries22. What matters is the relative abundance of labor, adjusted for
productivity, compared to the number of varieties.
I assume that there are two countries, home and foreign. Variables re-
lating to the latter are denoted by a star. Consumers’ preferences are still
defined by (1).There is a fixed endowment of labor in each country, L,L∗,
which is immobile. There are initiallyNA firms at home andN∗A firms abroad,
but firms can freely relocate. In equilibrium, there is an endogenous mass N
of firms producing at home, and N∗ = NA+N∗A−N firms producing abroad.
Goods are traded in a worldwide integrated market. The two countries differ
in their productivity a and a∗.
The demand for any good i (now indexed between 0 and N + N∗, with
good i produced at home iff 0 ≤ i < N) is now given by
ci = −
1
b
ln
pi
b
+
R NA+N∗A
0
pm
b
ln pm
b
dmR NA+N∗A
0
pmdm
+
Y + Y ∗R NA+N∗A
0
pmdm
= c(pi),
where Y (resp. Y ∗) is national income at home (resp. abroad). The
first-order condition for optimal pricing reads:
22Thus, the effect of globalization on the rich country is the opposite of the effect of
productivity growth.
24
−1
b
ln
pi
b
+
R NA+N∗A
0
pm
b
ln pm
b
dmR NA+N∗A
0
pmdm
+
YR NA+N∗A
0
pmdm
=
pi − wi/ai
bpi
, (23)
where wi = w, ai = a, if the firm is located at home, and wi = w∗, ai = a∗, if
it is located abroad.
This defines the optimal pi as a function of local marginal cost: pi =
p(wi/ai). Note that the p function does not depend on country-specific char-
acteristics, because firms face the same world demand regardless of their
location.
Mobility of firms between the two countries implies that profits must be
equalized
(p(w/a)− w/a)c(p(w/a)) = (p(w∗/a∗)− w∗/a∗)c(p(w∗/a∗)).
The model is closed by defining national incomes:
Y =
Z N
0
pmcmdm, Y
∗ =
Z N∗A+NA
N
pmcm, (24)
and writing down equilibrium in the labor market:
aL =
Z N
0
cmdm; aL
∗ =
Z N∗A+NA
N
cmdm (25)
Clearly, one can construct a symmetrical equilibrium where w/a = w∗/a∗,
cm =
aL+a∗L∗
NA+N
∗
A
, ∀m, N = aL
aL+a∗L∗ and p = p
∗ = 1, where the latter equality is
a normalization. Equations (23)-(25) allow to compute equilibrium wages in
both countries:
w = a(1− baL+ a
∗L∗
NA +N∗A
)
Under autarchy, one simply applies the model of section 1 to get (with
the prices of all goods again set to one):
wA = a(1− b
aL
NA
);
wB = a(1− b
a∗L∗
N∗A
).
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Hence, trade increases wages at home and reduces them abroad if
aL
NA
>
a∗L∗
N∗A
,
and vice-versa. The country where wages fall is the country where consump-
tion of each good is initially lower, i.e. the country where the number of firms
is higher relative to total productive capacity; or, equivalently, the country
where markups are lower under autarchy than under trade. By increasing
the output of firms based in that country, globalization moves it closer to the
Marxian zone, and its workers suffer from the higher markups applied by its
firms to new customers who care less about the good. From a factual point
of view, this may well be the poorest country—one may think it has fewer
varieties, but also a lower value of a.23 This result has a Stolper-Samuelson
flavor: the country where wages go up when moving from autarchy to trade
is the country where labor (as defined by aL, i.e. adjusted for productivity)
is more abundant relative to the number of varieties.
Note that these results hold if wages are expressed in physical terms, i.e.
they ignore the fact that wages can purchase more utility under trade because
they are spent on a greater variety of goods. If these effects are reintroduced,
one can show that in the country where wages fall, workers gain provided
their labor endowment is larger than a critical value24.
Again, these results are all due to the evolution of markups. If markups
were constant and equal to µ, one could check that the solution would be the
same, except for wages which would be given by wk = ak/µ, and therefore
would be equal to their level under autarchy. Globalization would then not
affect wages in physical terms and all workers would gain because it allows
23Another interesting implication is that productivity growth in one country unambigu-
ously reduces wages in the other one.
24It is easy to check that, if that country is ‘foreign’, this critical level is the value of l
which satisfies
1− e−w∗l
1− e−w∗Al =
N∗A
NA +N∗A
.
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them to access a greater variety of goods.25
3.3 A glance at the data
The model’s general message is that inequality between creative workers and
production workers goes up with the markup, which itself is an increasing
function of aL/N = c, the amount of each good consumed by the average
consumer,. If this phenomenon has contributed to inequality trends, then we
should observe some correlation between this ratio and inequality. Figure 5
plots the evolution of these two quantities over time in the United States.
The aL/N ratio was measured as the ratio between consumption per capita
in volume, from the OECD Economic Outlook database, and a measure of
the stock of trademarks, constructed from the US Patent and Trademark
office database.26. Inequality is defined as the 80/20 percentile income ratio,
computed from the Luxembourg Income Study database.27 Figure 5 suggests
that the increase in inequality during the eighties was preceded by an increase
in c. Similarly, the moderate decline in inequality after 1995 was preceded
by a fall in c. This picture suggests that movements in c lead movements
in inequality that go in the same direction. One may conjecture that the
increase in the returns to skill eventually led to an acceleration of innovation
which contributed to a rise inN relative to a, and eventually engineered the
reversal in inequality in the latter part of the nineties. Clearly, one cannot
ascribe 100 % of the change in inequality to changes in c; for example, the
25This section’s results are somewhat related to recent findings by Matsuyama (2000),
who considers the impact of productivity growth and globalization when poorer countries
are specialized in goods with a lower income elasticity.
26
The stock was constructed iteratively, on the basis on the flow of total trade-
mark registrations granted per year, with a depreciation rate of 5 %. The in-
tial value of the stock at date t = 1981 was assumed equal to the steady
state one, R1981/0.05, where R1981 is the number of registration granted in 1975.
(http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2000/00tables.pdf).
27The available years are: 1974, 1979, 1986, 1991, 1994, 1997, 2000. Numbers for
intermediate years were linearly interpolated.
27
rise in c in the early eighties is moderate compared to the corresponding rise
in inequality, while the fall in c in the nineties is much larger than the fall
in inequality after 1995. Nevertheless, the comovements between inequality
and lagged values of c are consistent with the model.
Does the model explain cross-country differences in inequality trends? A
substantial part of these differences is probably due to differences in institu-
tions, while some authors also point to differences in factor endowments.28
However, there may also be a role for the mechanism discussed in this pa-
per. Figure 6 compares the evolution of c in France29, where inequality has
essentially remained constant, and in the US, where it has increased up to
1995. As we can see, c falls more rapidly (and earlier) in France than in the
US, in accordance with the model.
While the evidence presented here will not convince any skeptic, it is
broadly consistent with the view that inequality goes up as total productive
capacity rises more than proportionally to the number of varieties.
4 Conclusion and assessment
The idea that general technical progress is harmful to labor and may lead to
”The end of work” is typically inconsistent with general equilibrium analy-
sis. General technical progress makes one unit of labor worth more in terms
of consumption goods. It is very hard to escape this conclusion in a well-
specified model. One can get transitory negative effects on labor if retraining
is needed (as in Aghion and Howitt, 1994), or if technical change is asymmet-
rical and labor reallocation is costly (as in Cohen and Saint-Paul, 1994), but
these effects are unlikely to be very long lived. In this paper I have shown, in
the context of a standard general equilibrium model of monopolistic compe-
28Beaudry and Green (2003).
29French data were taken from the WIPO data set, available at
http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/publications/25_years/index.htm.
This data set is less reliable than the USPTO dataset; in particular, there is an aberrant
break in the French data between 1995 and 1996. For this reason, Figure 6 is confined to
the 1981-1995 period.
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tition between differentiated goods, that if utility is finite, productivity will
affect markups in a way that is systematically detrimental to wages in the
tangible goods sector.
The model also sheds light on a number of policy issues. For example,
in, the Marxian zone, ”Malthusian” policies that oppose the adoption of new
technologies30, or prevent productivity from rising by imposing constraints
such as work rules or working time reductions, would seem to ”work” in
that they would benefit wages31, even though such policies are dominated
by mere redistribution to workers. Another implication is that profit-sharing
policies, as advocated by Weitzman (1984), would help make sure that all
agents benefit from productivity growth.
Before concluding, it is worth repeating that wages have increased by
30In Das Kapital, Chapter 15, Marx gives some interesting historical examples of such
policies:
”In the 17th century nearly all Europe experienced revolts of the workpeople against
the ribbon-loom, a machine for weaving ribbons and trimmings, called in Germany Band-
mühle, Schnurmühle, and Mühlenstuhl. These machines were invented in Germany. Abbé
Lancellotti, in a work that appeared in Venice in 1636, but which was written in 1579,
says as follows: ”Anthony Müller of Danzig saw about 50 years ago in that town, a very
ingenious machine, which weaves 4 to 6 pieces at once. But the Mayor being apprehen-
sive that this invention might throw a large number of workmen on the streets, caused
the inventor to be secretly strangled or drowned.” In Leyden, this machine was not used
till 1629; there the riots of the ribbon-weavers at length compelled the Town Council to
prohibit it. ”In hac urbe,” says Boxhorn (Inst. Pol., 1663), referring to the introduction
of this machine into Leyden, ”ante hos viginti circiter annos instrumentum quidam in-
venerunt textorium, quo solus plus panni et facilius conficere poterat, quan plures aequali
tempore. Hinc turbae ortae et querulae textorum, tandemque usus hujus instrumenti a
magistratu prohibitus est.” After making various decrees more or less prohibitive against
this loom in 1632, 1639, &c., the States General of Holland at length permitted it to be
used, under certain conditions, by the decree of the 15th December, 1661. It was also
prohibited in Cologne in 1676, at the same time that its introduction into England was
causing disturbances among the workpeople. By an imperial Edict of 19th Feb., 1685, its
use was forbidden throughout all Germany. In Hamburg it was burnt in public by order of
the Senate. The Emperor Charles VI., on 9th Feb., 1719, renewed the edict of 1685, and
not till 1765 was its use openly allowed in the Electorate of Saxony. This machine, which
shook Europe to its foundations, was in fact the precursor of the mule and the power-loom,
and of the industrial revolution of the 18th century. It enabled a totally inexperienced boy,
to set the whole loom with all its shuttles in motion, by simply moving a rod backwards
and forwards, and in its improved form produced from 40 to 50 pieces at once. ”
31Indeed, such policies are often advocated by people whose view of the world is similar
to the ”end of work” arguments.
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several orders of magnitude over the very long run. This is consistent with the
basic Solow model, and it is what happens along the balanced growth paths
that we have studied. The Marxian productivity paradox highlighted in this
paper certainly does not apply to the experience of modern economies over
the last two centuries. However, what is more plausible is that an economy
experiences stagnation or decline in wages for several decades as the outcome
of productivity growth and the ”banalization” of consumption. This is what
has been observed recently and what this model is aimed at explaining. In
the longer run, such a decline will be reversed, because productivity will
also increase in the knowledge sector, and also because public authorities
are likely to force a reduction in markups by competition policies such as
anti-trust laws, a mechanism we have ignored in our analysis by assuming
that monopoly power is intact in response to changes in productivity.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 : In order to prove that a symmetrical equilibrium
indeed exists, we need to prove that pi = 1 is the optimal price for a producer
if all other firms charge p = 1.
First, note that the demand function for good i is
D(pi) = −
1
b
ln pi +
Y
N
, for pi ≤ 1;
D(pi) =
Z +∞
N ln pi
b
g(R)(−1
b
ln pi +
R
N
)dR, for pi > 1
If pi > 1, then only consumers with an income greater than
N ln pi
b
consume
good i.
Next, the profit function for firm i is
π(pi) = (pi − w/a)D(pi).
Differentiating, and substituting (6), we get that for pi ≤ 1,
π
00
(pi) = −
1
bpi
− (1/b− Y/N)/p2i < 0
Thus, π(.) is concave for pi ≤ 1, so that π(1) ≥ π(pi) in this zone.
Consider now the zone where pi > 1. One has
π0(pi) =
Z +∞
N ln pi/b
g(R)(−1
b
ln pi +
R
N
− pi − w/a
bpi
)dR.
A sufficient condition is that this expression is nonpositive for all pi > 1,
which, changing variables and using again (??), can be rewritten as
F (z) =
Z +∞
z
g(R)(− z
N
+
R
N
− 1
b
+ (1/b− Y/N)e−bz/N)dR ≤ 0,∀z > 0
(26)
Note that F (0) = 0, which is just a restatement of the property that
π0(1) = 0.
Condition (26) can be rewritten as
34
Z +∞
z
g(R)RdR ≤
µ
z +
N
b
(1− e−bz/N) + Y e−bz/N
¶
(1−G(z)). (27)
Given that Y < N/b, a sufficient condition for (27) to hold is clearly (10).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1 : Assume (11) holds. Then
E(R | R ≥ z) =
R +∞
z
ug(u)du
1−G(z)
=
R +∞
0
(v + z)g(v + z)
1−G(z)
≤
Z +∞
0
(v + z)g(v)dv
= Y + z.
Q.E.D.
Derivation of (13). We now prove that (11) holds for the equilibrium
distribution of income if the h(.) and l(.) functions are given by (13).
Let us denote by R∗ = ωh(s∗) = wl(s∗) the income of the critical worker.
The distribution of income G(R) is given by
G(R) = h−1(R/ω), if R ≥ R∗;
= l−1(R/w), if R ≤ R∗.
Hence,
g(R) =
1
ωh0(h−1(R/ω))
, if R ≥ R∗;
=
1
wl0(l−1(R/w))
, if R ≤ R∗.
For condition (11) to hold, we then need that
A. l0(l−1(u+ v))(1− l−1(v)) ≥ l0(l−1(u)), if u+ v ≤ R∗/w
B. h0(h−1(u+ v))(1− h−1(v)) ≥ h0(h−1(u)), if u ≥ R∗/ω and v ≥ R∗/ω
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C. h0(h−1(u+ v))(1− l−1(ωv/w)) ≥ wl0(l−1(ωu/w))/ω, if u+ v ≥ R∗/ω,
u ≤ R∗/ω, v ≤ R∗/ω
D.h0(h−1(u + v))(1 − l−1(ωv/w)) ≥ h0(h−1(u)), if u + v ≥ R∗/ω, u ≥
R∗/ω, v ≤ R∗/ω
E. h0(h−1(u + v))(1 − h−1(v)) ≥ wl0(l−1(ωu/w))/ω, if u + v ≥ R∗/ω,
u ≤ R∗/ω, v ≥ R∗/ω
Let us now turn to specification (13). For h()/l() to be increasing, it must
be that
β
λ
>
h0
l0
.
Furthermore,
w
ω
=
h0 − ln(1−s
∗)
λ
l0 − ln(1−s
∗)
β
∈ (h0
l0
,
β
λ
).
The condition ωh(s∗) = wl(s∗) implies
− ln(1− s∗) = wl0 − ωh0
ω/λ− w/β .
The income of the critical worker is thus:
R∗ =
wω(l0 − λh0/β)
ω − λw/β .
And we have
l0(l−1(x)) =
eβ(x−l0)
β
;h0(h−1(x)) =
eλ(x−h0)
λ
1− l−1(x) = e−β(x−l0); 1− h−1(x) = e−β(x−h0).
Case A: substituting these formulae, we see that the inequality is equiv-
alent to
1 ≥ e−βl0,
which is true.
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Case B: Similarly, we get
1 ≥ e−γh0,
which is true.
Case C: the inequality is equivalent to
w
ω
≤ β
λ
e(u+v)(λ−βω/w)+2βl0−λh0 (28)
As ω/w > λ/β, the RHS is decreasing in u + v. It is always larger than
its minimum value, reached at u + v = 2R∗/ω = 2(βl0 − λh0)/(βω/w − λ).
Substituting into the RHS of (28), we see that it is satisfied for all the relevant
u and v if
w
ω
≤ β
λ
eλh0,
which is true, as wω <
β
λ .
Case D. The inequality is now equivalent to
1 ≤ e(λ−βω/w)veβl0.
Again, the RHS reaches its minimum value for the largest possible value
of v in this zone, v = R∗/ω = (βl0− λh0)/(βω/w− λ). Substituting, we find
1 ≤ eλh0,
which is true again.
Case E. The inequality is equivalent to
w
ω
≤ β
λ
eβl0e(−βω/w+λ)u.
The minimum of the RHS is reached at u = R∗/ω = (βl0−λh0)/(βω/w−
λ). Thus we need to have
w
ω
≤ β
λ
eλh0,
37
which is again satisfied.
The condition in lemma 1 is therefore satisfied by the distribution of
income corresponding to the symmetrical equilibriumwith l() and h() defined
by (13).
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Figure 5: consumption per trade mark and inequality in the United States
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Figure 6: The evolution of c in France and in the US
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